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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes the equilibrium dynamics in an economy facing an aggregate debt ceiling.
This borrowing limit is intended to capture an environment in which foreign investors base their
lending decisions predominantly upon macro indicators. Individual agents do not internalize the
borrowing constraint. Instead, a country interest-rate premium emerges to clear the financial market.
The implied equilibrium dynamics are compared to those arising from a model in which the debt
ceiling is imposed at the level of each individual agent. The central finding of the paper is that the
economy with the aggregate borrowing limit does not generate higher levels of debt than the







A central question in emerging-market macroeconomics is what factors lead
countries to accumulate excessive levels of external debt. It is often argued
by economic observers and policymakers that emerging markets tend to over-
borrow when the lending decisions of foreign ﬁnancial institutions are guided
by rough indicators of the emerging country’s macroeconomic performance
and not by careful assessment of individual borrowers’ abilities to repay. This
is because individual agents fail to internalize the eﬀect their own borrowing
decisions have on the country’s aggregate credit conditions. Overborrowing,
it is argued, makes emerging countries prone to balance-of-payments crises,
or sudden stops, and calls for government policy aimed at putting sand in the
wheels of external ﬁnance. The contribution of this paper is to investigate
whether the type of lending practices described above indeed lead emerging
countries to overborrow.
To this end, I characterize the equilibrium dynamics of a small open
economy subject to an aggregate borrowing constraint. I have in mind a sit-
uation in which foreign lenders lack the ability or the incentives to monitor
individual investment projects in the emerging country and instead base their
lending decisions on observation of a few macroeconomic indicators, such as
total external debt or output growth. Individual agents do not internalize
the credit constraint. I assume that in this economy credit rationing is imple-
mented through a market mechanism. Speciﬁcally, when the aggregate debt
limit is reached, an interest-rate premium emerges in the domestic economy
that ensures that individual borrowing decisions are collectively compatible
with the aggregate credit constraint. I compare the equilibrium dynamics of
this economy to those of an economy in which the borrowing limit is imposed
at the level of each individual agent.
The speciﬁc question that my investigation aims to address is whether
the economy with the aggregate debt limit tends to overborrow relative to
the economy with debt limits imposed at the level of each individual agent. I
1ﬁnd that there is no overborrowing in equilibrium. The reason is that in the
economy with the aggregate credit constraint, market incentives, conveyed
by the interest rate, induce individual saving decisions that are identical to
those caused by the imposition of agent-speciﬁc debt limits.
Two features of models with debt limits are key in generating no over-
borrowing. One feature is that when the debt constraint is internalized the
opportunity cost of funds is independent of the household’s debt position,
even for levels of debt arbitrarily close to the ceiling. Only when the debt
constraint is binding does the shadow cost of loans adjust upwards. The sec-
ond theoretical feature that is important in generating the no-overborrowing
result is that when the debt limit binds, it does so for all agents at the
same time. I present two theoretical examples showing that once any of the
aforementioned two features are absent aggregate debt limits may induce
overborrowing in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2 presents
a simple model of a small open economy facing an aggregate borrowing ceil-
ing. Section 3 presents an economy where the debt limit is imposed at the
individual level. Section 4 establishes analytically the central result of no
overborrowing. It shows that when the rents from ﬁnancial rationing accrue
to domestic residents, the equilibrium dynamics in the economy with the
aggregate debt limit and in the economy with the individual debt limit are
identical. Section 5 studies the case in which rents from ﬁnancial rationing
accrue to the foreign lenders. In this case, the economies with an individual
and an aggregate debt limit can no longer be compared analytically. How-
ever, I establish numerically the absence of overborrowing. Section 6 puts the
no-overborrowing result in perspective and explores modiﬁcations to the ba-
sic framework capable of inducing overborrowing in the presence of aggregate
debt limits.
22 An Economy With An Aggregate Borrow-
ing Ceiling
Consider an economy populated by a large number of identical households
with preferences deﬁned over consumption of a perishable good, ct, and labor





where U denotes the period utility function, which is assumed to be in-
creasing in the ﬁrst argument, decreasing in the second argument, strictly
concave, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable, With the purpose of ensuring
stationary equilibrium dynamics, I adopt a standard practice in modeling
small open economies by assuming that the subjective rate of discount is
a function of endogenous variables (see, for instance, Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe, 2003, and the references cited therein). Speciﬁcally, I let θ0 = 1 and
θt/θt−1 = β(Ct,H t), where Ct and Ht denote, respectively, aggregate con-
sumption and hours worked, and β is a function assumed to be decreasing
in its ﬁrst argument and increasing in its second argument. The household
takes the evolution of Ct and Ht as given. The choice of aggregate variables
as arguments of the discount factor simpliﬁes the household’s optimality con-
ditions. It will become clear, however, that the central result of this paper
is robust to assuming that the discount factor is a function of the individual
levels of consumption and eﬀort.
Output, denoted yt, is produced with a technology that takes labor as
the only input. Production is subject to an aggregate, stochastic, stationary
productivity shock denoted by zt. Formally, yt = eztF(ht). The production
function F is assumed to be positive, strictly increasing, and strictly concave.
Allowing for capital accumulation would not alter the main results of the
paper.
3The only ﬁnancial asset available to households is a risk-free international
bond. Letting at denote the household’s debt due in period t, its sequential
budget constraint is given by
at+1
Rt
= at + ct − e
ztF(ht), (2)
where Rt denotes the gross interest rate on assets held between periods t and
t + 1. Households are assumed to be subject to a no-Ponzi-game constraint
of the form limj→∞Et
at+j+1 Qj
s=0 Rt+s ≥ 0.
The household’s problem consists in choosing contingent plans ct, ht, and
at+1 so as to maximize (1) subject to (2) and the no-Ponzi-game constraint,
given the processes Rt and zt and the initial condition a0. The ﬁrst-order
conditions associated with this problem are (2), the no-Ponzi-game constraint







Uc(ct,h t)=β(Ct,H t)RtEtUc(ct+1,h t+1).
Foreign lenders impose an aggregate borrowing limit on the domestic
economy, which stipulates that the aggregate per capita level of external
liabilities assumed by the country in any period t ≥ 0, which I denote by
At+1, be no greater than a ceiling κ>0. That is,
At+1 ≤ κ.
Foreign lenders take the evolution of the country’s external debt At as given.
They interpret this variable as an indicator of the strength of the country’s
fundamentals and are willing to lend funds to domestic residents without
restrictions as long as the country’s external debt is below the threshold κ.
Individual domestic households also take the evolution of At as exogenous.
In periods in which the aggregate borrowing ceiling is not binding, for-
4eign investors lend to domestic residents at the world interest rate, which is
assumed to be constant and equal to R∗ > 1. When the aggregate borrow-
ing limit is binding, the domestic interest rate may adjust upward to ensure
market clearing in the domestic ﬁnancial market. In this case the economy
faces a country interest-rate premium, equal to Rt − R∗. It follows that Rt
must satisfy Rt ≥ R∗ and (Rt − R∗)(At+1 − κ)=0 .
2.1 The Rents From Financial Rationing
When the domestic interest rate, Rt, is above the world interest rate, R∗,a
ﬁnancial rent is generated. Values of Rt above R∗ create pure rents because in
this economy there is no default in equilibrium by assumption. The precise
way in which these rents are allocated will in general have consequences
for aggregate dynamics. Here, I consider two polar cases. In one case, all
ﬁnancial rents accrue to the foreign lenders. In the other case, ﬁnancial rents
accrue entirely to domestic residents.
When ﬁnancial rents are appropriated by nonresidents, increases in the
domestic interest rate entail a resource cost to the domestic economy as a
whole. This cost is reﬂected in an aggregate resource constraint of the form
At+1/Rt = At+Ct−eztF(Ht). Note that this expression features the domestic
interest rate, Rt, instead of the world interest rate, R∗.
Alternatively, rents from credit rationing could accrue entirely to domestic
residents. This case arises when, possibly because of competition among
foreign lenders, domestic ﬁnancial institutions borrow in the world ﬁnancial
market at the rate R∗. Thus, the country interest-rate premium represents a
net rent to domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries. I assume that these rents are
distributed in a lump-sum fashion among domestic households, who own the
domestic ﬁnancial institutions in equal shares. In this case, the existence of
an interest-rate premium does not introduce a resource cost to the domestic
economy. The aggregate resource constraint is therefore given by At+1/R∗ =
At+Ct−eztF(Ht). Note that this expression features the world interest rate,
5R∗, instead of the domestic interest rate, Rt.
Because households are homogeneous, in equilibrium we have that indi-
vidual and aggregate per capita variables are identical; thus Ct = ct, Ht = ht,
and At = at. We are ready to provide deﬁnitions of competitive equilibria
when ﬁnancial rents accrue to foreign lenders and when ﬁnancial rents accrue
to domestic residents:
Deﬁnition 1 (Equilibrium When Rents Accrue Domestically) A sta-
tionary competitive equilibrium under an aggregate borrowing ceiling when
rents from ﬁnancial rationing accrue to domestic residents is a set of sta-
tionary stochastic processes {ct,h t, at+1, Rt}∞
t=0 satisfying









at+1 ≤ κ, (7)
(Rt − R
∗)(at+1 − κ)=0 , (8)
at+1
R∗ = at + ct − e
ztF(ht), (9)
given the process {zt}∞
t=0 and the initial condition a0.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium When Rents Accrue to Foreigners) A sta-
tionary competitive equilibrium under an aggregate borrowing ceiling when
rents from ﬁnancial rationing accrue to foreign lenders is a set of stationary
stochastic processes {ct,h t, at+1,R t}∞




= at + ct − e
ztF(ht), (10)
given the process {zt}∞
t=0 and the initial condition a0.
6I postpone the characterization of equilibrium in these economies until I
described equilibrium in an economy with an internalized borrowing limit.
3 An Economy With An Individual Borrow-
ing Ceiling
Suppose now that lenders impose a debt ceiling at the level of each individual
household. That is,
at+1 ≤ κ. (11)
Unlike in the economy described in the previous section, in this economy
domestic agents internalize the borrowing constraint. Therefore, they will
take this constraint into account in solving their intertemporal optimization
problem. Accordingly, the household problem consists in maximizing (1)
subject to (2) and (11). The optimality conditions of this problem consist







= β(Ct,H t)EtUc(ct+1,h t+1),
ξt ≥ 0,
(at+1 − κ)ξt =0 ,
where ξt denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the debt con-
straint (11) divided by the marginal utility of consumption. When the debt
ceiling is binding, ξt is strictly positive, and the household faces an eﬀective
(shadow) interest rate given by ˜ Rt ≡ Rt/(1 − Rtξt), which is greater than
the market interest rate Rt. This eﬀective interest rate reﬂects the fact that
at the market interest rate the household would like to borrow beyond the
limit κ.
Foreign lenders supply funds to domestic residents at the world interest
7rate, R∗. Therefore, Rt equals R∗ at all dates and states. The following
deﬁnition of a competitive equilibrium then applies:
Deﬁnition 3 (Equilibrium With An Individual Debt Ceiling) A sta-
tionary competitive equilibrium under an individual debt ceiling is a set of














ξt ≥ 0, (14)
at+1 ≤ κ, (15)
(at+1 − κ)ξt =0 . (16)
at+1
R∗ = at + ct − e
ztF(ht), (17)
given the process {zt}∞
t=0 and the initial condition a0.
We are ready to compare equilibrium dynamics under aggregate and individ-
ual debt limits.
4 An Equivalence Result
In this section, I show that the equilibrium processes for debt, consumption,
hours, and output in the economy with an individual debt ceiling and in the
economy with an aggregate debt ceiling with rents from ﬁnancial rationing
accruing to domestic households are identical. To see this, consider the
economy with an individual debt constraint. Deﬁnition 3 lists the equilibrium
conditions corresponding to this economy. Equations (12) and (14) together
with the fact that Uc(ct,h t) > 0 imply that ξt ∈ [0,1/R∗). Deﬁne Rt =
R∗/(1−R∗ξt). Clearly, ξt > 0i ﬀRt >R ∗, and ξt =0i ﬀRt = R∗. With these
8results in mind, use the deﬁnition of Rt to eliminate ξt from the equilibrium
conditions (12)-(17). It follows immediately that the resulting expressions
are identical to the equilibrium conditions pertaining to the economy with
an aggregate debt limit and rents accruing to domestic households, given by
equations (4)-(9).
We conclude that in the simple economic environment studied here, the
practice by foreign investors of basing their lending decisions on macroeco-
nomic indicators—as opposed to individual solvency indicators—-does not
induce overborrowing. The individual incentives created by the market (i.e.,
by Rt) in the economy with the aggregate debt limit are exactly the same
as those emerging from an individual debt limit. Formally, as is clear in
the derivation of the equivalence result, the market and social price of exter-
nal funds are identical in the economy with the aggregate debt limit. The
following proposition summarizes the no-overborrowing result:
Proposition 1 (No Overborrowing) The equilibrium dynamics of ct, ht,
yt, and at are identical in the economy with an individual debt limit and in
the economy with an aggregate debt limit with rents from ﬁnancial rationing
accruing to domestic households.
This proposition is robust to a number of modiﬁcations of the basic model
within which it was derived. For instance, it can be shown that the equiv-
alence result continues to hold in the context of an economy with capital
accumulation. The result can also be shown to be robust to alternative spec-
iﬁcations of the discount factor. In particular, when the discount factor is
assumed to depend on the individual levels of consumption and eﬀort, as
opposed to aggregate measures of these variables. Enriching the sources of
uncertainty to include shocks to endowments, tastes, or the world interest
rate would also leave the no-overborrowing result unaltered.
The no-overborrowing result stated in proposition 1 contrasts sharply
with the ﬁndings of Fern´ andez-Arias and Lombardo (1998). These authors
conclude that when agents fail to internalize the debt limit, the economy
9tends to overborrow. The structure of the model economy used by Fern´ andez-
Arias and Lombardo is similar to the one presented here, with three nonessen-
tial diﬀerences. Namely, their model is cast in perfect foresight and in contin-
uous time, and output is assumed to take the form of an exogenous endow-
ment. The central diﬀerence between the Fern´ andez-Arias and Lombardo
model and the one I study here has to do with the mechanism through
which credit rationing is brought about in the economy with an aggregate
debt limit. In the formulation I adopt in this paper, credit rationing is im-
plemented through a market mechanism. The interest rate, Rt, adjusts to
induce agents to borrow an amount that in the aggregate is in line with the
credit limit imposed on the country as a whole. In the Fern´ andez-Arias and
Lombardo model, credit rationing is not implemented through the price sys-
tem. Indeed, they assume that the domestic interest rate is always equal
to the world interest rate (Rt = R∗, ∀t). Instead they impose a credit con-
straint of the type at ≤ aτ, t ≥ τ, at the level of each individual household,
where τ is the date at which the aggregate borrowing constraint becomes
binding, which is known under perfect foresight. Agents do not internalize
the fact that in equilibrium aτ must equal κ. Note that in the Fern´ andez-
Arias and Lombardo model agents internalize a substantial part of the credit
limit, namely the fact that individual debts cannot grow beyond aτ after
time τ. The only aspect of the debt ceiling agents do not internalize is the
ceiling κ itself. In the formulation adopted in the present paper, by contrast,
agents do not internalize any component of the credit limit. They borrow
and lend freely at the interest rate Rt (subject, of course, to the standard
no-Ponzi-game constraint).
5 Resource Costs
When rents from ﬁnancial rationing are appropriated by foreign lenders, it
is no longer possible to compare analytically the dynamics of external debt
10in the economies with the aggregate debt limit and in the economy with the
individual debt limit. I therefore resort to numerical methods to characterize
competitive equilibria.
To this end, I adopt the following functional forms for preferences and
technologies: U(c,h)=[ c − ω−1hω]
1−σ /(1−σ), β (c,h)=[ 1+c − ω−1hω]
−ψ,
and F(h)=kαh1−α, where σ, ω, ψ, k, and α are ﬁxed parameters. Table 1
displays the values I assign to these parameters. The time unit is meant to
Table 1: Parameter Values
σ ω ψ α R∗ κ k∗ πHH = πLL zH = −zL
2 1.455 0.0222 0.32 1.04 7.83 78.3 0.71 0.0258
be one year. The values for α, ω, σ, and R∗ are taken from Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2003). I set the parameter ψ so as to induce a debt-to-GDP ratio,
a/y, of 50 percent in the deterministic steady sate. The calibrated value of
κ is such that in the economy without the debt limit, the probability that
at is larger than κ is about 15 percent. The value assigned to the parameter
k ensures that, if k is interpreted as a factor of production that is in ﬁxed
aggregate supply (such as land), then its market price in the deterministic
steady state is unity. The productivity shock is assumed to follow a two-
state symmetric Markov process with mean zero. Formally, zt takes on values
from the set {z1,z2} with transition probability matrix π, and z1, z2, and
π satisfy z1 = −z2 and π11 = π22. I set π11 equal to 0.71 and z1 equal to
0.0258. This process displays the same serial correlation (0.58) and twice as
large a standard deviation (2.58 percent) as the one estimated for Canada
by Mendoza (1991). My choice of a process for the productivity shock that
is twice as volatile as the one observed in a developed small open economy
like Canada reﬂects the view that to a ﬁrst approximation what distinguishes
business cycles in developed and developing countries is that the latter are
about twice as volatile as the former (Kydland and Zarazaga, 1997).
I solve the model using the Chebyshev Parameterized Expectations method.
11Figure 1: Equilibrium Distribution of External Debt
























The state spaced is discretized using 1000 points for the stock of debt, at.
The parameterization of expectations uses 50 coeﬃcients. I compute the
equilibrium for three model economies: An economy with no debt limit, an
economy with a debt limit and ﬁnancial rents accruing to domestic resi-
dents, and an economy with a debt limit and ﬁnancial rents ﬂowing abroad.
The procedure approximates the equilibrium with reasonable accuracy. The
DenHaan-Marcet test for 5-percent left and right tails yields, respectively,
(0.047,0.046), (0.043,0.056), and (0.048,0.056). In conducting this test, I use
1000 simulations of 5000 periods (years) each, dropping the ﬁrst 1000 peri-
ods. The Matlab code that implements the numerical results reported in this
section are available on my website.
Figure 1 displays with a solid line the equilibrium probability distribution
of external debt in the economy with an aggregate debt limit and ﬁnancial
rents from rationing accruing to domestic agents. According to proposi-
12tion 1, this line coincides with the debt distribution in the economy with a
household-speciﬁc debt limit. The ﬁgure shows with a dash-crossed line the
distribution of debt in the economy with an aggregate debt limit and ﬁnan-
cial rents accruing to foreign lenders. As a reference, the ﬁgure also displays,
with a dashed line, the debt distribution in an economy without a debt limit.
The main result conveyed by the ﬁgure is that the distribution of debt in the
economy with a debt limit is virtually unaﬀected by whether ﬁnancial rents
are assumed to ﬂow abroad or stay within the country’s limits.
The resource costs due to ﬁnancial rents remitted abroad in the economy
in which this rents belong to foreigners are fairly small. This implication
is the result of two characteristics of the equilibrium. First, the economy
seldom hits the debt limit. In eﬀect, even though κ is calibrated to create
a right tail of 15 percent probability in the debt distribution pertaining to
the economy with no debt limit, in the economies with a debt limit this
constraint binds less than once every one hundred years. This shift to the
left in the distribution of debt is due to increased precautionary savings aimed
to mitigate the likelihood of holding too much debt in periods in which the
interest rate is above the world interest rate. Second, when the debt limit
does bind, it produces a country interest-rate premium of less than 2 percent
on average. Because the external debt is about 40 percent of GDP in the
economies with a debt limit, it follows that the cost of remitting ﬁnancial
rents abroad is less than 0.008 percent of GDP per year on average.
The no overborrowing result continues to hold under a more stringent
debt limit. I experimented lowering the value of κ by 25 percent, from 7.8
to 5.9. This smaller value of the debt limit is such that in the unconstrained
economy the probability that at is larger than κ is about 30 percent. Under
this parameterization, I continue to ﬁnd no overborrowing. Speciﬁcally, the
debt distribution in the economy with an aggregate borrowing limit and
rents accruing to foreign lenders is virtually identical to the distribution of
debt in the economy with an aggregate debt limit and rents accruing to
13domestic households, which, as stated in proposition 1, is identical to the
debt distribution in the economy with an individual borrowing limit.
6 Interpreting the No-Overborrowing Result
The analytical derivation of the no-overborrowing result makes it clear that
the reason why households do not have a larger propensity to borrow in the
economy with the aggregate debt limit is that in this economy the market
and social prices of international liquidity are the same. Two features of the
economy studied in this paper are crucial in generating this equality. First,
when the borrowing limit is internalized the shadow price of funds, given by
the pseudo interest rate R∗/(1 − R∗ξt), is constant and equal to the world
interest rate R∗ except when the debt ceiling is binding. The shadow price
of funds equals the world interest rate even as households operate arbitrarily
close to the debt ceiling.
Second, in the economy with the individual debt constraint, when the
debt ceiling binds, it does so for all agents simultaneously. This property is
a consequence of the assumption of homogeneity across economic agents.
These two features are present in more general formulations of credit
constraints than the simple one I consider in this paper.
Examples of environments in which the absence of either of the above-
mentioned two features causes the market price of foreign funds to be below
the social price thereby inducing overborrowing are not diﬃcult to come by.
In what follows, I spell out two such examples.
6.1 Debt-Elastic Country Premium
In this subsection, I present an example that illustrates that overborrowing
is more likely to arise when in the economy in which credit frictions are in-
14ternalized the (shadow) opportunity cost of funds increases as the individual
household assumes larger debt positions.
Consider the small open economy model with a debt-elastic interest rate
studied in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003). Speciﬁcally, let Rt = R(At+1),
with R0 > 0. Because individual households take the evolution of the aggre-
gate debt position, At, as exogenous, atomistic households do not internalize
the dependence of the interest rate on their individual debt positions. The
reason why the cost of funds is debt elastic is unspeciﬁed in this simple
setting, but it could be due to the presence of default risk as in models of
sovereign debt. Let A∗ denote the steady-state value of debt in this economy.
Then A∗ must satisfy the condition
1=R(A
∗)β,
where β is a constant subjective discount factor. Assume now that the debt-
elastic interest-rate schedule is imposed at the level of each individual house-
hold, so that Rt = R(at+1). Let A∗∗ denote the steady-state level of external






Clearly, the fact that R0 > 0 implies that, if a steady state with A∗∗ exists,




That is, the economy with the ﬁnancial externality generates overborrowing.
We note that in the economy with the aggregate debt limit the market price of
foreign funds, R(At+1), is strictly lower than the social cost of foreign funds,
given by R(At+1)/(1 − At+1R0(At+1)/R(At+1). This discrepancy, which is
key in generating overborrowing, is absent in the economy of the previous
sections.
156.2 Heterogeneous Agents
The following example describes a situation in which overborrowing occurs
because debt limits do not bind for all agents at the same time. The example
is in the context of a two-period, endowment economy without uncertainty.
The economy faces a constant debt ceiling κ per capita. There is a continuum
of agents of measure one, and agents are heterogeneous. The central result
obtains under a variety of sources of heterogeneity, such as diﬀerences in en-
dowments, preferences, or initial asset positions. Here, I assume that agents
are identical in all respects except in their period-2 endowments. Speciﬁcally,
all households receive the same endowment of y units of goods in period 1,
but in period 2, half of the households receive an endowment of ya >yand
the other half receive a smaller endowment of yb <y a. Agents receiving the
larger future endowment have a stronger incentive to borrow in period 1 to
smooth consumption over time.
We have in mind a situation in which in the absence of a debt ceiling
households with high expected endowment consume ca >y+ κ units in
period 1 and the rest of the households consume cb <y+ κ units. Figure 2
depicts the equilibrium in the absence of a debt constraint. In this case,
aggregate external debt per capita equals Au =( ca + cb)/2 − y.
When the borrowing ceiling κ is imposed at the level of each individual
household, half of the households—those with high period-2 endowment-are
constrained and consume y+κ units, whereas the other half is unconstrained
and consumes cb. Aggregate external debt per capita equals Ai =( κ + cb −
y)/2 <A u. Clearly, we also have that Ai <κ .
Now suppose that the debt ceiling is imposed at the aggregate level, If
aggregate external debt in the unconstrained environment does not exceed
the ceiling, i.e., if Au ≤ κ, then the equilibrium interest rate is the world in-
terest rate R∗, and consumption of each agent equals the level attained in the
absence of borrowing constraints. External debt is given by Aa = Au >A i.
Alternatively, if the aggregate level of external debt in the unconstrained en-
16Figure 2: Overborrowing in an Economy with Heterogeneous Agents
vironment exceeds the ceiling (i.e., if Au >κ ), then the economy is ﬁnancially
rationed, the domestic interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, and ag-
gregate borrowing per capita is given by Aa = κ>A i. Therefore, regardless
of whether the aggregate debt limit is binding or not, external borrowing is
higher when the debt ceiling is imposed at the aggregate level.
Therefore, the combination of heterogeneous consumers and debt limits
imposed at the aggregate level induces overborrowing in equilibrium. Over-
borrowing occurs because of a ﬁnancial externality. Speciﬁcally, the group
of more frugal consumers provide a ﬁnancial service to the group of more
lavish consumers by placing comparatively less pressure on the aggregate
borrowing constraint. This service, however, is not priced in the competitive
equilibrium.1
1Interestingly, economic heterogeneity, although of a diﬀerent nature, is also the root
cause of overborrowing in the dual-liquidity model of emerging-market crisis developed
by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001). In their model, there is heterogeneity in the
provision of liquidity across assets. Some assets are recognized as liquid collateral by both
domestic and foreign lenders, while other assets serve as collateral only to domestic lenders.
Caballero and Krishnamurth show that in ﬁnancially underdeveloped economies this type
176.2.1 Socially Optimal External Borrowing
The deﬁnition of overborrowing that I have applied thus far compares the
levels of external debt in economies with individual and aggregate borrowing
limits. When agents are homogeneous, this deﬁnition in most cases amounts
to comparing the competitive equilibrium with an aggregate debt limit with
the solution to a social planer’s problem that endogenizes the presence of
the aggregate credit limit. When agents are heterogeneous, however, this
equivalence ceases to hold. For in this case the benevolent social planner will
in general not wish to impose the same debt limit on each individual agent.
For the purpose of understanding overborrowing, it is important to limit
the role of the social planer to the optimal allocation of a limited amount of
foreign credit. In particular, is important to abstract from issues of wealth
redistribution. Therefore, we deﬁne the optimization problem of a social
planer that cares equally about all households as maximizing the average




2), subject to individual resource con-
straints, ca
1 + ca
2/R∗ = y + ya/R∗ and cb
1 + cb
2/R∗ = y + yb/R∗, and the
external credit constraint, ca
1+cb
1 ≤ 2(y+κ). Formally, the nonredistributive
nature of the social planer is reﬂected in the imposition of individual resource
constraints, as opposes of a single consolidated resource constraint. The ap-
pendix presents the optimality conditions associated with this problem and
works out a speciﬁc numerical example. The main conclusions of that analy-
sis are: (a) It is not socially optimal to equalize intertemporal marginal rates
of substitution in consumption across heterogeneous agents. By contrast,
in the competitive equilibrium with an aggregate debt limit intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution are identical across all households and equal
to the domestic interest rate. (b) The aggregate level of external debt per
capita in the competitive equilibrium with an aggregate debt limit is socially
optimal. This is obvious from the fact that both environments feature the
of heterogeneity produces an externality whereby the market price of international liquidity
is below its social marginal cost.
18same debt constraint, ca
1 + cb
1 ≤ 2(y + κ), which binds in the competitive
equilibrium with an aggregate debt limit iﬀ it binds in the social planer’s
problem. (c) There is overborrowing in the competitive economy with an
aggregate debt limit in the sense that big borrowers borrow more and small
borrowers borrow less than in the social planer’s equilibrium. (d) There is
underborrowing in the economy with debt limits imposed at the individual
level, in the sense that big borrowers borrow less and small borrowers borrow





19Appendix: Optimal Allocation of an Aggre-
gate Debt Limit
Consider a social planner that cares equally about each household and does
not pursue redistribution of wealth but limits its action to an eﬃcient allo-
cation of credit across households.
Speciﬁcally, in the example given in section 6.2, where the heterogeneity
originates in half of the population having higher endowment in period two,


































1 ≤ 2(y + κ).
Note that the planer’s problem features two intertemporal resource con-
straints, one for each type of agent, instead of a single consolidated resource
constraint. This separation reﬂects the fact that we do not allow the social
planer to pursue wealth redistribution. Letting µ denote the Lagrange multi-
plier associated with the borrowing limit, the ﬁrst-order conditions associated





















Consider the following numerical example. Let U(c1,c 2)=−1
2(c1 − ¯ c)2 −
β
2(c2 − ¯ c)2 and R∗ =1 /β. We adopt the following speciﬁc parameter values:
20y =1 ,ya =2 ,yb =1 .5, R∗ =1 /β =1 .1, ¯ c = 3, and κ =0 .3. The matlab
program heterogeneous.m on my website implements the numerical exercise
conducted here.
Unconstrained Equilibrium
Let Y a = y + ya/R∗ =2 .82 and Y b = y + yb/R∗ =2 .36 denote the present
discounted value of the endowment streams evaluated at the world interest



























u1 − y =0 .24








Under an individual debt constraint, we have that individual and aggregate
















− y =0 .27.
6.3 The Social Planer’s Problem
Under the assumed quadratic period utility function, the ﬁrst-order condition











Using these expressions to eliminate ca
s2 and cb




















































=2 ( y + κ).






b) − (1 + R
∗)(y + κ).
22Competitive Equilibrium with an Aggregate Debt Limit




a1 − ¯ c = βRa(c
a
a2 − ¯ c).






a1 +[ 1− (βRa)
−1]¯ c.
We assume that rents from ﬁnancial rationing are distributed lump-sum to
households to ensure that in equilibrium the present discounted value of con-
sumption evaluated at the world interest rate equals the present discounted
value of endowments also evaluated at the world interest rate. Using the
above equation to eliminate ca






























We report here the equilibrium values implied by our assumed parameteri-
zation. The equilibrium conditions cannot be expressed in closed form, so











a1 − y =0 .18.
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